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Abstract: in clinical diagnosis, both causal attribution and the interaction 
between different types of probability may take place. We deal with 
a hypothetical, but quite realistic, clinical case and go through various 
idealized ways in which the case can be framed. in the diverse scenarios 
linked to our proposed case, the possibility of causal attributions will be 
taken into account and each one of them will correspond to a distinct role 
of probabilistic evaluation. For some of these scenarios, it will be necessary 
to comply with certain requirements such as the construction of a specific 
partition that serves as a point of reference for the diagnostic analysis. the 
interaction between probabilities occuring within these scenarios will be 
critically investigated, as it may shed light on some causality claims in clinical 
diagnosis.
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introduction
some Italian and Polish methodologists and philosophers of medicine highlighted 
the distinction between the research activity geared towards broadening medical 
knowledge—possibly leading to the identification of new diseases or the discovery 
of new biomedical processes—and that which is aimed at recognizing the disease 
or the patho logical process affecting a particular individual.1
According to Augusto Murri (1841–1932), the accelerated progress of 
theoretical knowledge in medicine has contributed to a widening gap between 
clinical activity and pathological research. He argued that the activity of the 
clinician was very different from that of the pathologist. While the latter seeks 
to solve new open problems, attempts to point out new relationships between 
phenomena, and ends up viewing diseases as abstract entities, the former only 
needs to re-cognize (ri-conoscere, in Italian) the disease; that is to say, to place 
the phenomena occurring in a patient within the context of the already codified 
know ledge. Murri was convinced that the clinician’s task of re-cognizing might 
be even more challenging than that of the researcher. While the latter, in fact, 
can isolate a problem from contour factors, and tackle the problem with the 
help of an experiment, the clinician has to consider and dissect the entire set of 
phenomena that is present in his/her patient.
likewise, Giovanni Federspil (1938–2010) and cesare scandellari (1933– ) 
endorse Murri’s distinction of the two main medical fields: the pathological and 
the clinical. Also according to them the objectives and methods of pathological 
research vary from those of clinical activity, but they never affirm that the 
biomedical knowledge of the pathologist is irrelevant to solving clinical problems.
tytus chalubinski (1820–1889), founder the Polish school of Philosophy of 
Medicine, along with his colleague edmund Biernacki (1866–1911) argued that 
the clinical method must be based on a holistic approach and be directed towards 
the care of the symptoms. According to Biernacki, in particular, the clinician’s 
work does not require deep understanding of the phenomena that occur in 
the human body. He distinguishes the know ledge, often only partial, of the 
disease from its recognition, and admits that the progress in the understanding 
of diseases has refined the dia gnostic possibilities, but believes that “knowledge 
about the diseases and therapeutics are independent of one another, and in fact, 
1 see Murri, 1972; 2004; Antiseri, 1981; scandellari & Federspil, 1985; Federspil, 2004; 2010; 
scandellari, 2010; and löwy, 1991.
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they exist in the doctor’s mind as two different kinds of knowledge” (Biernacki, 
1991, p. 57). contrary to what most doctors believe, a diagnosis is not necessary 
for the treatment of diseases.2 However, Wladyslaw Bieganski (1857–1917), 
another member of the same school, believes that the clinician cannot renounce 
establishing what the nature of the disease affecting the patient is and that the 
therapeutic indications should be grounded on this judgment.
The present paper builds upon the point of view of the aforementioned 
methodologists and philosophers of medicine, accord ing to which clinical 
activity has its own methods and does not intend—at least as its primary goal—
to increase the knowledge of pathological science, even if it presupposes the 
codified knowledge of this science in order to make the correct diagnosis and 
then proceed to therapeutic indications.3
In particular, we will assume that, in certain cases, the clinician avails himself/
herself of the already established causal knowledge, sometimes expressed by means 
of sentences of the type, ‘the phenomena X may be caused by Y’, or ‘the phenomena 
X are sometimes/often/always caused by Y’. We also argue, as is implicitly assumed 
in clinical practice, that nothing prevents in talking about the probability that the 
phenomena X are caused by Y. such talk merely needs to be clarified.
The knowledge of the causes constitutes a part of the pathogenetic knowledge and 
certainly contributes towards justifying the diagnosis. However, this knowledge 
is not always available. Johansson and lynøe distinguish between the knowledge 
of the mechanisms “that explain how a certain event can give rise to a certain 
effect” (Johansson & lynøe, 2008, p. 179) and the correlation knowledge that 
provides “statistical asso ciations between diseases and variables such as age, sex, 
profession, home environment, lifestyle, exposure to chemicals, etc.” (Johansson 
& lynøe, 2008, p. 181). These two types of knowledge are interconnected:
mechanism knowledge and correlation knowledge cannot only complement each 
other, but also interact in a way that makes both of them grow faster than they 
would on their own (Johansson & lynøe, 2008, p. 182).
As suggested by Johansson and lynøe, even correlation knowledge, when 
appropriately improved, can help reach a diagnostic judgment.
2 Diagnostic reasoning does not occur just in medicine but also in other clinical disciplines such 
as nursing (see, for instance, Zanotti & chiffi, 2015) and other sciences.
3 The Polish Bieganski, who also argues for the need to provide a diagnosis, and who connects 
diagnosis and therapy, is rather concerned with emphasizing the unity of medicine than with 
the diversity of tasks pertaining to pathology and clinical medicine.
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Whatever type of knowledge the clinician refers to, it is unavoidable for him/
her to make probabilistic assessments. Additionally, it is un realistic to expect 
that his/her assessments do not represent a personal opinion. It is reasonable, 
instead, to expect and to require that the clinician takes into account the relevant 
statistical probabilities. When doing so, the clinician may draw inferences—
called ‘cross-over prob abilistic inferences’ by Johansson and lynøe—in which 
“the premises are frequency-objective (ontological) statements and the conclusion 
is a subjective (epistemological) probability statement” (Johansson & lynøe, 
2008, pp. 139–140). We agree entirely with this, but we would also like to add 
that the cross-over be tween different kinds of probabilities does not have only an 
inferential form. Below, we will provide a more general analysis of this.
In clinical diagnosis, both the process of causal attribution and the cross-over 
between probabilities may take place. We will deal with a hypothetical, yet quite 
realistic, clinical case and will propose different idealized scenarios where the case 
can be applied. The possibility of causal attributions will gradually decrease and 
the role of the probabilistic evaluations will change. On some of these idealized 
scenarios, special require ments need to be satisfied by the partition providing the 
point of reference for the diagnostic research. The cross-over between probab-
ilities occurs in these framings as an important, not negligible aspect.
The clinical case: first version
suppose we know that a given pathogen g rarely causes disease f. Doctors tend 
to express themselves in this way, without offering any overarching analysis 
about what it means to say that something never/rarely/ ... /often/always causes 
something else. let us call G the exposure to g and F the patient coming down 
with the disease f. As many doctors would do, we assume, moreover, that the 
fact that g rarely causes f implies that, with respect to the reference population, 
the statistical probability P(F/G) is low or very low. How can one neverthe-
less say that, in certain specific circumstances, the event F is due to the event 
G? If a is the individual in question, how can one, in other words, say that in 
the given circumstances Fa took place4 because of Ga? Both Fa and Ga took 
place, but obviously this is not enough to justify the assertion ‘Fa because Ga’, 
where the ‘why’ has causal meaning. May we think that in the circumstances in 
4 Here, and in the following, we adopt this shorter way of speaking instead of referring, more 
correctly, to the event the sentence is about.
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which the event Fa has taken place, including the previous occurrence of Ga, the 
probability of Fa given Ga, understood as a non-statistical probability, is much 
higher than P(F/G)? Do we thus have an example of a cross-over probability? 
consider the following case. We know that the probability of a person who 
has eaten shellfish developing a glottal oedema is low, and we also know that 
James has eaten shellfish. We observe that James has developed a glottal oedema. 
The glottal oedema is “a rare pathological condition, allergic in nature that 
occurs shortly after the contact between an allergen and a sensitive subject, and 
admits only a few possible causes among which there is certainly the ingestion 
of shellfish” (Federspil, 2005, p. 76)5. Knowing that in the few hours before 
the onset of the glottal oedema James had not come into contact with other 
substances possibly containing allergens, a clinician would conclude that, with 
high probability, James developed the oedema of the glottis due to the ingestion 
of shellfish.
From the logical point of view, the clinician makes an inference based on 
the premises which he recognizes as true and the inference leads him/her to 
recognize the truth of the conclusion that is inferred. What are the premises 
of the inference? If we include among them the general relev ant knowledge 
concerning the glottal oedema, we have:
(A) The probability that a person who has eaten shellfish shortly afterwards 
 will develop a glottal oedema is low.
(B)  James has eaten shellfish.
(B1) James has a glottal oedema.
(B2) The glottal oedema has an allergic cause.
(B3) After the ingestion of shellfish, and before the onset of the glottal 
oedema, James did not come into contact with known allergens other 
than those contained in shellfish and a possible previous contact with a 
known allergen could not have caused the oedema.
(B4) The glottal oedema appeared shortly after the ingestion of shell fish.
The conclusion that is considered as being very likely is the following:
(c) The cause of James’ glottal oedema was the ingestion of shell fish.
5 Glottal oedema, better known nowadays as laryngeal oedema, is an “abnormal accumulation 
of fluid in tissues of any part of the larynx, commonly associated with laryngeal injuries and 
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The conclusion (c) actually appears very likely, despite the premise (A). 
consequently, one might have the impression that an event, that is, James’ 
glottal oedema, which according to (A) is unlikely given the ingestion of shellfish, 
appears certainly, or almost certainly to be caused by the ingestion of shellfish. 
suppose that (A) is asserted on the base of a statistical investigation. Do we have 
a transition from a low statistical probability to a high probability of another 
kind?
We cannot give an accurate response without first observing that the ingestion 
of shellfish, which is given in (A) as the condition of a conditional prob ability, is 
alleged as something that happened to James and is then integrated with other 
information, including a specific example of the type of conditioned event, that is, 
James’ glottal oedema. If we keep on talking in terms of conditional probability, 
we might be tempted to say that the supposed statistical probability P(F/G) has 
given way to the probability of Fa given Ga and other information. There seems 
to be a transition from a statistical probability into a different kind of probability, 
though it should be noted that the transition is made while changing the content 
of the conditional probability. 
The probabilistic analysis of the inference should be carried out in detail, but 
before doing so, it is worth pointing out that this type of analysis could be 
avoided, or brought about in a special way, if, after all the assumptions are made 
explicit, the inference ends up having a deductive nature.
suppose it is considered obvious that
(c1) The absence of contact with allergens other than those contained in 
shellfish neces sarily implies that none of them can have caused James’ 
oedema.
Therefore, the falsity of the conclusion (c) is only possible, despite the truth 
of the premises (B)–(B4), if one admits to the possibility that James’ oedema 
depends on an allergen, which is unknown to us but which he came into contact 
with. In fact, from (B1) and (B2) it follows that the oedema of the glottis is only 
due to the action of an allergen; (B3) states that shellfish contain the only known 
allergens James had contact with and which could have caused the oedema; and 
(B4) states that the time between the ingestion of shellfish and the appearance of 
the glottal oedema was short, thus seeming to exclude—with high probability, 
but still in a way that is difficult to determine—that James could have come 
into contact with an unknown allergen such as to cause the oedema of his 
glottis. If this possibility is ruled out, (A) does not seem to have any role in the 
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justification of (c); thus, we can share Federspil’s statement that “the conclusion 
is not based on the probability inherent in the law invoked” (Federspil, 2005, p. 
76).6 Assuming that
(c2) James did not come into contact with any unknown allergen
we can point out that the piece of reasoning that was implicitly carried out 
appears to be deductive in nature.7
Of course, being able to reach a diagnostic conclusion by deductive inference 
does not guarantee the certainty of the conclusion. The con clusion of a deductive 
inference is certain if all of its premises are certain. since this is not always 
the case, then neither can the conclusion gained through deductive reasoning 
always be certain. The case of premises not all being certain is quite common, 
but we cannot always notice the non-certainty of a premise. For example, it 
may be difficult to notice that in the deductive inference from (B)–(B3) and 
(c1)–(c2) to (c). consider, in particular, the pre mises (B2), (B3) and (c2). (B2) 
is a general statement concerning the cases of glottal oedema. Unless it is a part 
of the definition of a glottal oedema that its only possible causes are allergens, 
it cannot be excluded that there might be cases of this disease that do not have 
an allergic cause. concerning (B3), its reliability depends, among other things, 
on an investigation based on indirect observations, which were not made by the 
clinician but were reported to him, and which might be insufficient to exclude 
contact with other known allergens. (c2) appears to be plausible, given the 
breadth of available knowledge about the possible allergens, but it obviously 
cannot be accounted for as certain.
If the uncertainty of a sentence s is defined as 1-prob(s), where ‘prob’ is an 
appropriate notion of the probability for sentences, we know that the uncertainty 
of a deductive conclusion does not exceed the total uncertainty of the premises, 
given by the sum of the uncertainties of the individual premises. In short, the 
uncertainty does not increase when validly inferring the conclusion. It can remain 
the same if the premises are consistent and all of them are essential for the validity 
of the deductive conclusion (Adams, 1975, 1998; Hájek, 2001). consequently, 
in general, a deductive conclusion is less uncertain the less uncertain its premises 
are. It follows that assump tions that are more or less plausible (though not 
6 There is a clear similarity between the case described by Federspil and the famous case of 
paresis due to syphilis adduced by scriven (1959) to show that the causal attribution does not 
presuppose the high predictability of the caused effect.
7 Note that (c2) can be suggested, of course not justified, by (B4), and bereaves (B4) of any role 
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certain), and that are too often taken for granted, may give the conclusion a 
degree of uncertainty that is too high compared to what is reasonably required 
for a clinical diagnosis and a choice of therapy.
However, is it adequate to define the uncertainty of a sentence s as 1-prob(s)? For 
the sake of argument, let us assume that it is, even if in the case under inspection, 
the probability concerns (also) sentences stating relations of causation, which 
is knowingly a complex and controversial issue. We agree that it is not clearly 
evident how to find a way to assign a probabilistic value to a statement of 
causation such as (c). An objective sense can be suggested by the fact that an 
allergen acts only under certain conditions, so that one might think to look for 
the percentage of the cases where such conditions are satisfied among the cases 
of contact with the allergen. On the other hand, the fact that these conditions 
are generally not known, or cannot be ascertained, seems to give room for the 
application of a subjective-epistemic notion of probability. 
At any rate, it has to be kept in mind that the clinician has to express himself/
herself about particular cases on the basis of what he/she believes, and what 
he/she believes depends on his/her expertise and scientific background. Thus, 
it seems only natural to interpret the probabilistic assessments of the clinician 
about a particular case in an epistemic-subjective sense, as confidence levels based 
on personal opinions and knowledge. This calls for the question of how should 
the clinician be influenced by the available ‘objective’ scientific and statistical 
knowledge. It is a difficult and complex problem, which we will try to deal with 
in the next sections.
the clinical case: second version
suppose that the clinician does not have any doubt about the allergic nature 
of the glottal oedema, hence he/she accepts (B2), but he/she is not willing to 
hold (B3) (after the ingestion of shellfish, and before the onset of the glottal 
oedema, James did not come into contact with known allergens other than those 
contained in shellfish, and a possible previous contact with a known allergen 
could not have caused the oedema) because he/she is not sure of the reliability 
of the investigation that was carried out to establish (B3). The clinician might 
even doubt that the particular piece of shellfish eaten by James contained any 
allergens. The deduction of (c) is no longer possible, thus the possibility of 
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evaluating the probability of (c) based on how the uncertainty of the premises 
is transmitted to the conclusion through deductions, is no longer available.
can the clinician calculate the probability of (c) in a different way? let us 
observe at the outset that the problem is not to determine how high the 
conditional probability is that James will have an oedema of the glottis given 
that he has ingested shellfish. When identified with the statistical probability of a 
glottal oedema given the ingestion of shellfish, this probability is low and, in any 
case, cannot in itself adequately represent a relation of causation. On the other 
hand, if it is assumed—from a Bayesian point of view—that both James’ glottal 
oedema and his previous ingestion of shellfish are acquired as entirely certain 
information, then the probability of each one of the two events is to be updated 
to 1 and, therefore, even the conditional probability of the former event given 
the latter is to be updated to 1.
One might even decide to disregard any understanding of the relation of 
causation and may simply say that the statement (c) is justified to the extent 
that the oedema event is predictable from the ingestion of shell fish, according to 
the classical approach of the ‘received view’ in philosophy of science. Yet, if we 
only rely on the statistical prob ability of the glottal oedema given the ingestion of 
shellfish, the absence of an oedema, rather than its appearance, is also predictable. 
Additionally, the absence of an oedema would have been predictable with even 
higher probability, if one were able to verify with certainty that James did not 
come into contact with any other (known or unknown) allergen. Perhaps the 
knowledge of certain physiological features of James would have allowed the 
clinician to make a reliable prediction of the appearance of the glottal oedema, 
but such knowledge was not, and is not available.
We assume that the relation of causation cannot be eliminated, or reduced to 
other notions, and we will consider how it is possible to assign a probabilistic 
value to the causal statement (c). Note that the clinician already knows that 
James has a glottal oedema. His/her final objective is not to ascertain the degree 
of probability for James to develop the oedema after the ingestion of shellfish, 
but rather to treat the oedema; in this sense it may be useful for the clinician 
to know what has caused the oedema in order to remove it. The etiological 
knowledge may also be useful for preventing future oedemas and this could be 
an additional motivation for the search of the cause.
since the clinician cannot fully ascertain the cause with complete certainty, he/
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known causes are; that is, for each possible cause, the clinician can assess the 
conditional probability of the oedema given the cause and the other relevant 
information. Based on such probab ilities, the clinician can easily see which one 
holds the highest rank.
In this research, the clinician is faced with two problems. In the first place, 
the conditional statistical probability of a possible cause, given the morbid 
phenomenon, is not often immediately available. secondly, the clinician must 
take into account what he/she knows about James. Regard ing the first issue, the 
inverse probabilities of the morbid phe nomenon given the possible cause and the 
initial epidemiologically based probabilities can be more readily known. suppose 
that these probabilities are known, and therefore the requested conditional 
probabilities may be indirectly reconstructed from them. In order to consider the 
special features of James—this is the other problem to deal with—the clinician 
could transform these probabilities into subjective-epistemic probabilities. By 
benefitting from a basic idea by salmon and applying Bayesianism, the clinician 
may proceed as follows.
We refer to as large as possible a population R of individuals who came into 
contact with at least one known allergen, and we call A the property of having 
a glottal oedema. For each set of known allergens, consider the property of 
having come into contact with the allergens of the set. For the sake of simplicity, 
we assume that there are only two allergens, c1 and c2, corresponding to the 
c1 property of having been in contact with c1 and the c2 property of having 
been in contact with c2. The properties to be considered are therefore c1∧¬c2, 
c2∧¬c1 and c1∧c2. call, respectively, K1, K2 and K3, their restrictions to R
8 
and suppose that the statistical probabilities P(A/R) and P(A/Ki), 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 
are known. suppose also that P(A/Ki) ≠ P(A/R) for all i. It follows that every 
property Ki is statistically relevant for A within R, following salmon’s definition 
of this notion. According to the way in which Ki has been introduced, and based 
on the shared scientific knowledge, Ki (with i ≤ 3) can have causal efficacy for 
A; namely, having the property Ki may causally determine having the property 
A, since c1 or c2 can cause the oedema of the glottis. even if K3 is defined by the 
exposure c1∧c2, the causal role of K3 may be due to the causal efficacy of only c1, 
of only c2 or of both c1 and c2. Assume that for the cases of oedema in K3 there is 
no possibility of identifying which of these possibilities took place.
8 A, K1, K2 and K3 isolate certain classes to which we refer in the same manner.
15
Varieties of Probability in clinical Diagnosis
Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae scientiarum  
Vol. 6, no. 1 (spring 2018) 
let us wonder whether, based on the already acquired knowledge—that is, the 
scientific knowledge s and evidence e—, we know some conditions F contributing 
to the causation of the glottal oedema, such that P(A/Ki∧F) > P(A/Ki). If the 
answer is negative, we say that the class described by Ki is epistemically and 
causally homogeneous with respect to A, s and e. If, for each i, the class described 
by Ki is epistemically and causally homogeneous with respect to A, s and e, the 
partition K of R in K1, K2 and K3 is epistemically and causally homogeneous 
with respect to A, s and e.
The main distinction between the notion of homogeneity and that of salmon 
regards the restriction of the quantification to the conditions that have a causal 
role for the explanandum. Of course, speaking of a causal role introduces some 
lack of clarity that the context may eliminate partially, but not completely. On 
the other hand, there now seems to be a broad consensus that it is not possible 
to provide an eliminative reduction of the relation of causation. In addition, 
because of the ir reflexivity of the causation relation, speaking of a condition F 
endowed with causal role for the explanandum A is advantageous for immediately 
excluding that A itself may be regarded as one of the con ditions F by which to 
assess the homogeneity of the classes of the considered partition.
Is the concept of epistemic causal homogeneity useful to the clinician dealing 
with James’ case? Ki is epistemically and causally homogeneous with respect to 
A, if any further causal specification of Ki is not known such as to make A more 
likely. The idea that we want to capture is that having the property Ki is known 
as causally contributing to having A, and there is nothing more that one can 
know about it. 
If James has the property Ki, if Ki is epistemically and causally homogeneous 
with respect to A, and if that is known as a part of the total available evidence, 
it is reasonable to require that the clinician assigns to James a probability of 
developing a glottal oedema that depends on the statistical probability P(A/Ki). 
More precisely, if James is called j, it is natural to require and to assume that the 
subjective prob ability p of the clinician and the evidence e available to him/her 
are such that:
(i) p(Aj/e) = p(Aj/(Kij ∧ P(A/Ki) = q))
that is, the subjective probability that the clinician assigns to Aj given e is 
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where P(A/Ki) is the statistical probability of A in Ki.
9 If it is certain that P(A/
Ki)=q, then p(Aj/(Kij ∧ P(A/Ki) = q)) = p(Aj/Kij). Moreover, we assume that no 
other relevant information is available, so that it is also natural to assume:
(ii) p(Aj/Kij) = q
that is, the subjective probability of Aj given Kij has the same value q as the 
statistical probability P(A/Ki).
10
If we already know that James had a glottal oedema and that he belongs 
moreover to a specific Ki, then the knowledge of the causal role of Ki justifies a 
corresponding attribution of causality, even when P(A/Ki) is low.
11 In this case, 
the value of the statistical probability P(A/Ki) does not have any significant role, 
as it falls within the deductive reconstruction of the argument.
However, we are now considering the case in which the clinician does not accept 
(B3) and therefore does not know that James belongs to a specific subclass Ki. For 
each subclass Ki, the clinician may have uncer tain evidence of James’ belonging 
to Ki. suppose, for example, that his/her subjective evaluations are the following:
 p(K1j) = 0.4
 p(K2j) = 0.5
 p(K3j) = 0.1
In general, the subjective evaluations of the clinician can vary within a very 
wide range, but they should be compatible with a correct use of the available 
information. Notably, the clinician should not assess James’ belonging to a 
specific Ki as being more likely, only because (using the example) the oedema of 
the glottis would be statistically more likely in Ki. The incorrectness of such an 
assessment should be intuitively evident if we consider the case of a Ki with very 
few elements. The possible higher level of probability of A in Ki can surely not 
be a reason for considering James’ belonging to Ki as more likely.
 
9 We are assuming the possibility of a fully subjective interpretation of probability, including 
conditional probability and a posteriori probability.
10 see (Festa, 2004, p. 60 and p. 64). We emphasize the assumption that the statistical probabilities 
have been correctly determined and are certain.
11 More precisely, James’ assignment to K1 justifies the identification of the cause of his oedema 
with c1, James’ assignment to K2 justifies the identification of the cause of his oedema with c2, 
James’ assignment to K3 leaves open any causal attribution.
17
Varieties of Probability in clinical Diagnosis
Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae scientiarum  
Vol. 6, no. 1 (spring 2018) 
concerning the conditional probabilities of the type p(Aj/Kij), let us continue 
to assume that the total evidence available to the clinician is not such as to make 
p(Aj/Kij) different from P(A/Ki). For purely illustrative purposes, we can suppose 
that the clinician endorses the following, completely hypothetical, conditional 
probabilities: 
 p(Aj/K1j) = 0.2
 p(Aj/K2j) = 0.1
 p(Aj/K3j) = 0.3
From Bayes’ theorem, it follows that:
 p(K1j/Aj) = (0.4×0.2)/(0.4×0.2+0.5×0.1+0.1×0.3) = 
  0.08/(0.08+0.05+0.03) = 0.08/0.16 = 0.5
 p(K2j/Aj) = (0.5×0.1)/0.16 = 0.05/0.16 = 0.31
 p(K3j/Aj) = (0.1×0.3)/0.16 = 0.03/0.16 = 0.18
Thus, the probability of belonging to the class K1 given the glottal oedema is 
greater than the other conditional probabilities of the same type. since there 
is a causal significance of K1 with respect to A, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the probability that c1 caused James’ oedema is the highest because the 
probability of James’ belonging to K1 (given his oedema) is the highest.
the clinical case: third version
suppose now that the initial uncertainty is even greater. The clinician does not 
accept (B3) (after the ingestion of shellfish and before the onset of the oedema 
of the glottis, James did not come into contact with known allergens other than 
those contained in shellfish, and previous contact with a known allergen could 
not have caused the oedema). The clinician does not even accept (c2) (James did 
not come into contact with any unknown allergens), as he/she is not willing to 
exclude any unknown-allergen contact for James. Obviously, the deduction of 
(c) is not possible and, again, it is no longer possible to assess the probability of 
(c) based on the way in which the uncertainty of the premises is transmitted to 
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The (partial) statistical-causal analysis proposed above cannot be re applied 
without incurring major changes.
In this case too, we assume that the known allergens are only c1 and c2, 
corresponding to the property c1 of having been in contact with c1 and to the 
property c2 of having been in contact with c2. The reference class is a population 
R, which this time includes individuals who have not come into contact with any 
known allergen. Thus, four properties need to be considered: c1∧¬c2, c2∧¬c1, 
c1∧c2 and ¬c1∧¬c2. For each of their restrictions to R—call them, respectively, 
K1, K2, K3 and K4—let us suppose that we know the statistical probability P(A/
Ki), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, given by the frequency of A in Ki. If P(A/Ki) ≠ P(A/R), the 
property Ki is statistically relevant for A within R.
Assume that for each i ≤ 3 P(A/Ki) > P(A/R), but P(A/K4) < P(A/R). K1, K2 
and K3 may have causal efficacy for A in the same sense that is assumed above. 
However, it is difficult to argue that K4, namely, ¬c1∧¬c2, has causal efficacy 
for A. The clinician is convinced that A may also have causes other than c1 or 
c2, but he/she is oblivious to how many or what they may be. In addition, since 
P(A/K4) < P(A/R), K4 does not make A more likely.
suppose, for each i ≤ 4, and therefore also for i = 4, that no conditions F are 
known, which are endowed with causal efficacy for A and are such that P(A/
Ki∧F) > P(A/Ki). still, since it is not possible to provide any reason for the causal 
role of K4, K4 cannot be regarded as epistemically and causally homogeneous 
with respect to A and to the available knowledge. Then, it is not even possible to 
consider the partition K of R in K1, K2, K3 and K4 as epistemically and causally 
homogeneous with respect to A and to the available knowledge. 
It may, therefore, not be possible to assign a higher probability to a specific causal 
attribution. This takes place when James comes out as most likely belonging to 
the class K4. suppose, for example: 
 p(K1j) = 0.1  p(Aj/K1j) = 0.4
 p(K2j) = 0.2  p(Aj/K2j) = 0.5
 p(K3j) = 0.1  p(Aj/K3j) = 0.6
 p(K4j) = 0.6  p(Aj/K4j) = 0.2
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It follows that:
 p(K1j/Aj) = (0.1×0.4)/(0.1×0.4+0.2×0.5+0.1×0.6+0.6×0.2) = 
  0.04/(0.04+0.1+0.06+0.12) = 0.04/0.32 = 0.12
 p(K2j/Aj) = (0.2×0.5)/0.32 = 0.1/0.32 = 0.31
 p(K3j/Aj) = (0.1×0.6)/0.32 = 0.06/0.32 = 0.18
 p(K4j/Aj) = (0.6×0.2)/0.32 = 0.12/0.32 = 0.37 
In this case, James’ probability of not having come into contact with any of the 
known allergens is the highest. Note, moreover, that upon admission of the 
existence of an unknown allergen, even the certainty of contact with the known 
allergen does not rule out other possible contact with an unknown allergen, and 
that the latter may have caused the oedema.
the clinical case: fourth version
How should one proceed when one observes a glottal oedema in the case—
entirely fictional—in which no possible cause is known? suppose that the clinician 
knows only that certain conditions favour the appear ance of the oedema; namely, 
that the oedema is more frequent among those who satisfy at least one of certain 
conditions. In epidemiological terms, we can say that we only know of some risk 
factors for the oedema of the glottis. In general, risk factors cannot be considered 
as causes and their know ledge might have no utility in terms of diagnosis and 
treatment. suppose, however, that certain conditions are useful in determining 
the type of oedema, the prognosis and possibly the treatment. In this case, it is 
natural to try to determine what the condition was that favoured James’ oedema, 
as it would be useful information from the clinical point of view, even if it was 
not sufficient to identify a cause with certainty and precision.
But what type of conditions are we to consider? The clinician should draw 
information from his/her pathological and epidemiological knowledge, but he/
she should also be guided by some methodological principles that are justified 
by general epistemological considerations. In particular, although in the case 
imagined it is not possible to speak of causes, but only of favourable conditions, 
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of the causes, even if the conditions not excluded cannot be qualified as causes. 
In particular, D can be a cause of e neither if it takes place after e, nor if both D 
and e are direct effects of a third event c (a conjunctive fork). 
In the following, we will only touch upon some basic ideas proposed by 
Hans Reichenbach and Patrick suppes, with the understanding that the line 
of research they set forth does not necessarily lead to a satisfactory notion of 
probabilistic causality. Reichenbach’s and suppes’ proposals mainly concern 
the problem of distinguishing between correlations and caus ality, as well as the 
problem of recovering an asymmetrical probabilistic causal relation so as to have 
the probabilistic cause preceding the probabilistic effect.
The first problem concerns the conjunctive fork, which is defined by Reichenbach 
as follows:
 1. 0 < P(c) < 1
 2. P(D∧e/c) = P(D/c) P(e/c)
 3. P(D∧e/¬c) = P(D/¬c) P(e/¬c)
 4. P(D/c) > P(D/¬c)
 5. P(e/c) > P(e/¬c)
condition 1 states that the probability of the event c is in the open interval 
(0, 1), conditions 2 and 3 state that D and e are probabilistically independent 
with respect to c and to ¬c, while conditions 4 and 5 state that c is positively 
relevant for both D and e. It is often said that c and ¬c screen off D from e. 
conditions 1–5 entail 6:
 6. P(D∧e)  >  P(D)P(e); namely, there is a positive correlation 
  be tween D and e, but this is due to the common ‘cause’ c.
Thus, if there is a positive correlation between D and e and there is an event c 
which satisfies 1–5, then c is a (probabilistic) cause for both D and e, and this 
fact explains the lack of independency between D and e (Reichenbach, 1956).12 
Regarding the second problem, suppes assumes, as a primitive fact, that a cause 
temporally precedes its effects. On the basis of that, he introduces the idea of a 
12 It has been observed that when more events screen off D from e, the notion of the conjunctive 
fork is not sufficient to individuate a common cause (Uffink, 1999), but we will not go into 
this issue herein.
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prima facie ‘cause’ such that when it occurs, it increases the probability of the 
effects (suppes, 1970). suppes states that c at t’, shortly ct’, is a prima facie 
‘cause’ of e at t, shortly et, if and only if:
 t’< t
 P(ct’) > 0
P(et/ct’) > P(et), which holds only in cases where P(et/ct’) > (et/¬ct’) holds.
He later defines a strong notion of a spurious cause as follows: ct’ is a spurious 
‘cause’ of the event et if and only if ct’is a prima facie ‘cause’ of et and there is a 
partition {K1,t’’, K 2,t’’, ..., Kn,t’’} such that
 t’’ < t’
 P(et/ct’∧Ki, t’’) = P(et/K i, t’’), where i is a natural number belonging to [1, n].
A genuine cause is a non-spurious prima facie ‘cause’. 
The search for a satisfactory notion of probabilistic causality13 con tinued and 
attempts were made to face the many paradoxes that were more or less associated 
with it (the simpson Paradox, the lindrey–Jeffrey Paradox, etc.). In the following, 
we merely hint at a simple way in which the basic idea of screening off—which 
was already tacitly applied—might be slightly modified by adding a temporal 
reference and is then used for diagnostic purposes in the new imaginary version 
of our case, where no proper causal knowledge is assumed to be available.
The reference class is made up of a population R, which we assume to be divided 
on the basis of the conditions c1 and c2 in such a way that the properties c1∧¬c2, 
c2∧¬c1, c1∧c2 and ¬c1∧¬c2 determine a partition K in the corresponding 
classes K1, K2, K3 and K4. let Ki,t be the class of the instances of Ki at t and At’ 
the class of instances of A at t’, where t < t’. We can request that Ki,t should be 
considered as a condition that favours At’ only if
14 there is no known condition 
ct*, defined on R, where t* < t, such that ct* screens off Ki,t from At’. Then, the 
diagnostic process may proceed as above, transforming statistical probabilities of 
the form P(/) into a subjective-epistemic probability of the form p(/) with the 
aim of seeking for which Ki,t p(Ki,tj/At’j) is the highest. 
13 The original motivation for this line of research was a reductionist one. see salmon (1980) for 
a critique of such motivation, which is now generally abandoned.
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Note that also other requirements, formulated to reach a satisfactory concept of 
probabilistic causality, can or should help lead the search towards an informative 
condition about the pathology affecting a patient (when its origin and evolution 
are widely unknown).
The final, though not minor, problem
The classes into which the reference population has been partitioned correspond 
to the number of hypotheses about the cause or condition that have favoured 
James’ oedema. The assignment of James into any of these classes has an 
initial plausibility that the clinician can quantify by means of prob abilistic 
values representing the extent of his/her initial confidence in their truth. As 
emphasized above, these values should be used as the basis by which to calculate 
the probability of James’ belonging to each class, given the oedema. 
As stated by Johansson and lynøe (2008, p. 134), “it is difficult, not to say im-
possible, to ascribe numerical values to epistemic statements”. However, there 
are procedures that may help the clinician explicitly and soundly to assess the 
epistemic initial prob abilities. 
Note that it is also possible that the clinician’s assessment of the initial probability 
ends up being inconsistent. The so-called expert elicitation can be applied to 
single out and eliminate potential inconsistencies. Many techniques of eliciting 
probabilities are available (slottje, sluijs & Knol, 2008). According to one of 
these techniques, the expert is asked to evaluate whether the actual value of a 
quantity is higher or lower than a certain number. This can be carried out, for 
instance, by means of graphical tools such as probabilistic wheels. Alternatively, 
the expert is asked to fix the value of a quantity such that the probability of 
higher or lower values turns out to be some specific amount. We do not go into 
the analysis of these techniques. What is important for our discussion is that the 
clinician should be aware of the possibility of incurring in consistencies and also 
of the availability of some methods for avoiding these.15 
Moreover, even if clinician’s assessments of the probabilities relevant to a specific 
clinical problem comply with the rules of the probability calculus, nonetheless 
15 However, we do not rule out the possibility that the clinician may face some kinds of 
fundamental uncertainty in which probabilities are not well definable or computable and some 
forms of abductive reasoning are required (chiffi & Pietarinen, 2017).
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they might turn out to be arbitrary, at least to a cer tain extent. Arbitrariness 
should be limited and, in fact, can be reduced by taking into account the 
epidemiological information. Of course, epidemiological data is not always 
relevant when dealing with a clinical case. It seems reasonable to hold that it 
may be relevant for the analysis of a clinical case when some of the following 
conditions are fulfilled (lagiou, Adami & trichopoulos, 2005):
1. The exposure to risk factors is also an established cause of the disease; 
2. The exposure of the individual is similar (as regarding duration, intensity, 
latency) to the exposure causing the disease;
3. The disease of the individual must be similar to that which is etiologically 
associated with the exposure;
4. The individual has to be not exposed to other risk factors; and
5. The relative risk (RR)—namely, the ratio of the probability of the disease 
in the exposed population to that in the unexposed popu lation—must be 
greater than 2. If the RR is lower than 2, then the association between the 
exposure to the risk factor and the disease needs to be carefully analysed and 
methodologically motiv ated, since a weak association does not rule out the 
possibility of the clinical relevance of such an association.
These conditions must not be seen as robust criteria supporting the use of 
epidemiological data in the clinical context, but rather as constraints functioning 
as standards that guide the integration of epidemological evidence in clinical 
practice. It is important to stress that the clinician’s decision-making process can 
greatly benefit from clinical guidelines. Of course, the clinician can break away 
from the guidelines if there is a reasonable motivation for a different judgment. 
Nevertheless, such subjective judgment, even when it is formally consistent, 
cannot be arbitrary but should be meth odologically constrained and explicitly 





Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae scientiarum 
Vol. 6, no. 1 (spring 2018) 
concluding remarks
 
We discussed the role of causality and probability assignments in re lation to a clinical 
case that seemed to us to be quite significant. The analysis that has been carried out 
is grounded on some theses about the nature of the physician’s diagnostic activity. 
Initially, we endorsed the idea that clinical diagnosis is based on pathological 
knowledge that has already been acquired and that it is not intended to extend 
this know ledge, although it might unintentionally lead to the acquisition of in-
formation that is useful for its extension. secondly, we observed that presupposed 
knowledge can be both causal knowledge and correlation knowledge. causal 
knowledge concerns events that trigger disease processes and the very mechanisms 
by which these processes evolve. Based on classical and recent research concerning 
the notion of cause, we hold that this concept is not completely reducible to other 
concepts, and that a primitive idea of causal relationship may tacitly underlie the 
research of correlations that are relevant for medical knowledge.
We emphasized that the role of probability is crucial. It is even crucial to assess 
the confidence to be accorded to conclusions obtained deduct ively from not 
entirely certain premises. In our view, we are bound to assume that the clinician’s 
assignment of probability to a specific case is the result of his/her own evaluation, 
leading us to conclude that probabilities are to be regarded as subjective. However, 
it is quite natural to request non-arbitrary and (as far as possible) statistically-
based probabilities.
It seems to us that in clinical diagnosis initial probabilities are more difficult 
to connect with statistical data. That is not surprising and, to a certain extent, 
is as it should be. There is, however, a problem in assuring the consistency 
and limiting the arbitrariness of the clinician’s evaluations. We hinted at some 
indications, taken from the literature, which might be useful for this purpose. 
some conditional probabilities are rather more easily identifiable with suitable 
statistical frequencies. The identification requires a high degree of normative 
idealization and we derived from the literature some indications about the ideal 
way in which this identification can be pursued. In a less idealized approach, 
there might be other more general, justified ways in which the clinician may 
transform the conditional statistical probabilities into sub jective conditional 
probabilities regarding the patient he/she is taking care of. 
After all, it appears that two kinds of probability have a definite role: the 
frequency-objective and the epistemic/subjective. Is there any role for some 
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other kind of probability, in particular, for a notion of probability as propensity? 
surely, the clinician may base his probabilistic assessment of a patient having a 
certain disease on a more or less justified attribution of certain propensities to 
him/her. But is this enough, or are other reasons also needed to identify a role for 
a specific kind of a propensity-based singular-objective probability? We do not 
exclude that a deep understanding of medicine in general, not only of clinical 
activity, might require some room for a propensity interpretation of probability. 
However, a further separate and dedicated analysis is needed.16
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